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OCCAM’S PHASER: MAKING PROPORTIONAL  
DISCOVERY (FINALLY) WORK IN LITIGATION
BY REQUIRING PHASED DISCOVERY
Michael Thomas Murphy*
ABSTRACT
This is an article about solving the problem of expensive electronic 
discovery in litigation by simply learning the most important facts first. Judges 
and parties often complain that the scope of information included in fact 
discovery in civil litigation is overinclusive and disproportionate to size of the 
dispute, resulting in overly expensive costs. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure recently changed again to further emphasize the use of 
“proportional” limits in discovery, but provide little practical mechanism for 
parties, lawyers, and judges to make discovery “right-sized.” This Article 
proposes that parties should be required to “phase” discovery by first setting 
the initial scope of discovery in a case as small as practicable and focused on 
the most important, outcome-determinative facts, and then following this small 
scope of discovery with additional “phases” if needed. The scope of discovery 
will then become incrementally broader in scope during each phase, but will 
only do so upon a showing of need for additional discovery. Phased discovery 
is used sporadically in litigation, often with success. This Article discusses 
these successes, considers potential drawbacks of phasing, and asks the key 
question: why wouldn't it work? 
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INTRODUCTION
It is clear that discovery in Federal Cases must become less expensive.1
But how? As electronically stored information (ESI) cost continues to dwarf 
litigation budgets, judges and clients are pushing lawyers to limit discovery.2
The recent reemphasis on proportional discovery in the 2015 amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the latest visible iteration of that push.3
But even those amendments only increase emphasis, which amounts to 
encouragement, not requirement.4 Parties are still free to set the limits of
discovery as broad as they wish.5
This Article considers a more stringent approach to proportionality, in 
which the parties have to set limits to discovery. It examines the effectiveness 
of requiring discovery to be held in “phases,” where the parties, with judicial 
oversight (and control if necessary) set the initial scope of discovery in a case 
to be proportionally as small as practicable, followed by any number of 
additional phases. The discovery “in play” in a case will then become 
incrementally broader in scope during each phase, but will only do so upon a 
showing of need, instead of a hurried and ill-informed analysis at the outset of 
the pleading phase of a case. 
Part I is a recitation of the current law and past practice of 
“proportionality” with respect to the scope of discovery, as described in the 
Federal Rules, case law and scholarship. It examines in particular the struggle, 
and sometimes reluctance, of judges to set a scope of discovery in civil cases. It 
also describes the 2015 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which place added emphasis on proportionality in discovery. It ends with a 
discussion of whether the revised rules go far enough toward achieving 
proportional discovery and suggests that the current system places too much of 
an onus on the parties’ cooperating to make the scope of discovery “right-
sized.” 
Part II suggests that Courts should anticipate conflict over the proportional 
scope of discovery and phase that discovery. In that way, discovery starts 
small, and grows only upon a showing that such growth is reasonable and 
necessary for the finding of truth. While this approach has its drawbacks and 
may not be appropriate for all circumstances, it is more likely than the current 
system to ensure that the discovery in each case is right-sized, preventing 
nuisance settlements and bloat. This Part cites cases and systems in which 
1. See Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the
Norm, Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 513 (2010) (discussing the high 
costs of the current discovery system and declaring the system to be “broken”). 
2. See id. at 513-14.
3. Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 855-57 (2015).
4. Id. at 875.
5. Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 517 (discussing a tension between broad
discovery and just, speedy resolution of disputes). 
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phasing is used, to positive effect. 
Part III examines the obstacles of implementing phased discovery, 
anticipating resistance to the idea of changing the discovery process and 
examining the strengths and weaknesses of such resistance. 
The article briefly concludes in Part IV with a discussion of phased 
discovery’s place in modern litigation, and whether it is a logical response to 
big data’s disrupting litigation, drawing a parallel to computer-assisted review. 
I. PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY AND WHY IT’S SO HARD TO ACHIEVE
Discovery in a lawsuit is, at its core, a mechanism by which parties and a 
factfinder collect and review information to determine what “really” happened. 
It is a quest for truth.6 Discovered information becomes admissible evidence to
be used at a trial, where a factfinder weighs the litigants’ competing assertions 
of truth. It is not a perfect system.7 It was never intended to be a perfect
system.8 Even still, the system provides for a comprehensive collection,
exchange, and examination of all relevant information as a means to locate and 
bring forth the truth.9 The default rule is that all such information should be
collected, reviewed, and considered, no matter how ultimately important to the 
factual or legal determinations at issue.10
Often, “all of the relevant information” is a lot of information. It can be too 
much information.11 Simple math dictates that, under the American system, a
party facing a $50,000 potential judgment in a lawsuit but $100,000 in legal 
6. Robert G. Johnson, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 15 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1, 1 (1982) (describing discovery as “an adversary proceeding in which is undertaken a 
‘search for truth.’” (quoting People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 139 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1957))). 
7. See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 515 (collecting sentiment and concluding that
“[j]udges and litigants now routinely describe modern discovery as a ‘morass,’ ‘nightmare,’ 
‘quagmire,’ ‘monstrosity,’ and ‘fiasco.’” (footnote omitted) (twice quoting AM. COLL. OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM app. B at B-1 to B-2 (2008), 
http://www.actl.com/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conten
tID=3650; then quoting PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
657 (DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *1, 8, 12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007)).  
8. Id. at 514.
9. This is not the case in other countries. For example, one commentator noted that
“[t]he rest of the world rejects ‘fishing expeditions’ and tolerates decisions based on limited 
information in a way we do not.” Richard L. Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Adapt to Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, in SHIRA SCHEINDLIN & DANIEL
CAPRA, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE 22 (3d ed. 2015). 
10. See Milberg LLP, Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not in Our
Rules . . ., 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 139 (2011) (describing “open-deck” discovery). 
11. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 573-77 (2010) (discussing the negative effects of 
excessive discovery costs). 
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fees for discovery in that lawsuit has an easy, if morally questionable decision 
to make: the prudent move is to settle the suit for up to asking price regardless 
of the merits.12
This is no mere fantastic hypothetical. For example, e-discovery vendor 
DTI cites this case study: 
[A] corporate client defending itself in a matter in which plaintiff’s proposal
for expanded discovery would actually have cost more than the entire amount
at issue in the case! The original discovery request was for seven core
custodians,13 requiring collection of 38GB of data; of that, 1.4GB (or less than
4%) was determined to be relevant after searching the data with the latest
technology, using client-supplied search terms. The cost of discovery for those
seven custodians was a reasonable $10,000, but in a motion to compel, the
opposition requested an additional 65 custodians. Looking at actual processing
and searching performed for the original custodians, reasonable per-unit cost
estimate was established and, in response to the motion, the court was
provided with an affidavit showing tiered costs: actual costs for the original
seven custodians, and cost projections that included half (39 total) and all (72
total) of the additional custodians requested in the new motion. Based on the
original “sample” of seven, discovery experts were able to project collection
of all additional custodians at a cost of $153,000, an amount clearly out of line
with the $140,000 at issue in the entire case. In light of the documented lack of
proportionality between the discovery request and the value of the case, and
given the low percentage of relevant data in the initial sample from the most
promising custodians, the motion to expand scope made little sense and was
dismissed.14
It is that “easy” decision that inspires commentators to declare the 
discovery system “broken,” “flawed,” and so forth.15 A 2008 survey by the
12. Id. at 573, citing AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM app. A at A-4 (2008), 
http://www.actl.com/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conten
tID=3650. 
13. A “custodian” in this context is a person who has discoverable data in his or her
possession or control. 
14. Samantha Green, Proportionality. Are Discovery Costs Proportional to the Value
and Importance of the Case?, ORANGE CTY. ATTORNEY JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://attorneyjournaloc.com/blog/2015/04/04/proportionality-are-discovery-costs-
proportional-to-the-value-and-importance-of-the-case/. 
15. As it has been pointed out, though, that was the original intent of unlimited
discovery. See Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 139 n.24 (“[T]he right of 
free and unlimited discovery before trial . . . [will] probably result in the disposition of much 
litigation without the need of trial.” (quoting Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and 
Summary Judgments, 22 A.B.A. J. 881, 884 (1936)). This is unquestionably true today, but 
the modern view of this result is that it is a problem, not a solution. See Charles M. Yablon 
and Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the 
Resolution of Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 719, 721 (2012) (noting, among other examples, that “the [modern] controversial 
heightened pleading standard . . .  is expressly designed to protect certain defendants from 
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Federal Judicial Center of lawyers in 3550 cases found that roughly a quarter of 
attorneys believed that the costs of discovery in their cases were “too high” 
relative to the amount in controversy, and roughly a third felt that discovery 
costs generally influence settlement.16 Roughly half of the attorneys surveyed
knew of at least one client who settled a case primarily because of litigation 
costs, including discovery costs.17
A. The Solution Is: Less Discovery. But How?
“Fixing” the system falls on cost control. It is imperative to make 
discovery less expensive, so that that same $50,000 judgment case costs less 
(hopefully far less) than $50,000 to litigate. But how? Increases in document 
review technology can drive down costs and are a helpful development, if 
notably hesitantly adopted.18 But with the amount of information created by
litigants (and everyone else) only increasing, litigants, judges, and scholars 
have put a greater emphasis on a fairly radical idea: just limit discovery to the 
important information. 
This idea is “fairly radical” because it is in some sense at cross-purposes to 
the quest for truth. By limiting discovery, the actors in a lawsuit are 
consciously disregarding relevant information, which in many instances, given 
the imperfect nature of human recollection, no witness will remember. That 
information remains in the “unknown unknown,”19 and the limiters of
the ‘burdens of discovery,’ which are said to be ‘sprawling, costly and hugely time-
consuming.’” (first quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009); then quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007))). 
16. JUDGE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, MEMORANDUM TO JUDGE JEFFREY SUTTON RE:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE at Rules Appendix B-
6 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18218/download, [hereinafter June 2014 
Rules Report]. 
17. Id.; cf. Ann G. Fort, Rising Costs of E-Discovery Requirements Impacting
Litigants, LAW.COM (Mar. 20, 2007), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005554136/Rising-Costs-of-EDiscovery-
Requirements-Impacting-Litigants?slreturn=20160317173351 (estimating a cost of $2.70 to 
$4 per email produced); Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: 
A Proposal for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
473, 474 n.4 (2010) (“Discovery should not be a sporting contest or a test of wills, 
particularly in a bankruptcy case where the parties’ resources are limited and the dollar value 
of the stakes is often low[.] [The parties’] conduct in the discovery phase of this matter ha[s] 
significantly multiplied its burdens, both on the Trustee and the Court.” (quoting In re 
Spoonemore, 370 B.R. 833, 844 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007)) (second and third alterations in 
original)). 
18. See Ralph C. Losey, Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A
Marriage Made in Big Data, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 25 (2013-2014) (describing a slow 
adoption of predictive coding despite obvious benefits due to an initial lack of judicial 
approval). 
19. This idea is commonly attributed to Donald Rumsfeld, who famously stated:
[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there 
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discovery are relying on their own imperfect knowledge and judgment to 
disregard information. 
However, this “self-service” system of limitation has been languishing in 
the Rules of Civil Procedure as the best imperfect solution to discovery’s 
proportionality problem.20 For many years before its 2015 amendment, Rule
26(b)(2)(C) provided a system of proportionality that was restrictive, kicking in 
essentially when a litigant objected to the amount of discovery sought. 21
Buttressing this concept was Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii), which requires a lawyer 
signing a discovery request (or response or objection) to certify that “to the best 
of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable 
inquiry,” the discovery demanded is “neither unreasonable nor unduly 
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in 
the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in 
the action.”22 Litigants have a responsibility to the system and themselves to
agree to keep discovery affordable and proportional. 
B. Proportionality’s Long Journey Around the Federal Rules
That responsibility is not lost on rule-makers. The rules seem to prescribe 
proportional discovery, but it remains a legal mechanism that is, by many 
accounts, underutilized, with over half of federal judges ignoring the rule 
altogether and commentators calling the proportionality rule more of a “ripple” 
in the law than a sea change.23
are also unknown unknowns—the ones don’t know we don’t know. 
MARK STEYN, Rummy Speaks the Truth, Not Gobbledygook, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9, 
2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3599959/Rummy-speaks-the-
truth-not-gobbledygook.html. But it is also fairly common in project management circles. 
See Bonnie Biafore, Project Management Fundamentals, LYNDA.COM (Dec. 14, 2011), 
https://www.lynda.com/Business-Skills-tutorials/Project-Management-Fundamentals/80780-
2.html.
20. See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 517.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014) (amended 2015).
22. FED R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).
23. Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 145, 180-81 (2012) (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD
L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2011)). Singer writes:
As one group of commentators noted, the “paucity of reported cases” citing to or applying 
the rule demands the conclusion that “the amendment itself seems to have created only a 
ripple in the caselaw.” Other commentators have offered less charitable assessments, 
concluding that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) has been “ineffective,” “seldom used,” and “ignored” by 
the courts. Even federal judges, the most obvious beneficiaries of the 1983 proportionality 
provisions, have acknowledged that they very rarely invoke Rule 26(b)(2)(C) on their own. 
Professor Miller himself lamented years later that the provisions have “all been largely 
ignored.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting The Judge’s Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LITIG. 89, 123 
(1982) (comments of William F. Schwartzer); then quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 2008.1; 
then quoting Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens 
Associated with E-Discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Indeed, this lack of acceptance is likely the reason that commentators have 
noted a “peripatetic existence” of the proportionality rules, observing that they 
tend to breeze around the Federal Rules, moving to Rule 26(b)(2) in 1993, 
sharing time between Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 26(b)(2) in 2000, then ending up 
(for the time being) in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) in 2006.24 Rule 26(b)(2) in its 1993
version sought to empower courts to limit discovery when necessary and stated 
that: 
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines 
that: . . . (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and 
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 25
The 2000 Amendments added a “redundant” cross-reference to the limitations 
in Rule 26(b)(2) to the end of Rule 26(b)(1).26
Through this time, an emphasis on proportionality gained some ground. 
Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have adopted proportionality 
considerations within their rules.27 In other instances, judges have developed
Procedure, 59 MERCER L. REV. 963, 969 (2008); then quoting Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey 
Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV.
327, 349 (2000); then quoting Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause is Bad Medicine for the New E-
Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49, 60-61 (2007); and then quoting Edward Becker 
et al., Transcript of the “Alumni” Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 809, 815 
(1998)). Singer then cites data showing that “[n]early sixty percent of federal district and 
magistrate judges in a recent survey reported that they ‘almost never’ invoke Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) on their own initiative.” Id. at 181 n.116 (quoting CORINA GERETY, TRIAL BENCH 
VIEWS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 31-32 (2010)). See also 
id. (“[T]he proportionality principle of Rule 26(b)(2) . . . is not being used by 
judges”(quoting Ronald J. Hedges, Annotation, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A 
Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
227 F.R.D. 123, 127 (2005))). 
24. Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 874-75; see also Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M.
Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV 20 (2015). 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (1993) (amended 2000).
26. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of
Proportionality in Discovery GA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 15-1; George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-02, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2551520. 
27. See Sean R Gallagher & Lauren E. Schwartzreich, The Proportionality Test:
Resolving E-Discovery Disputes in Employment Litigation (Midwinter Meeting of the Am. 
Bar Ass’n Employment Rights and Responsibilities Comm., 2010),  
http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/errcomm/mw/Papers/2010/data/papers/005.pdf; see also 
Seventh Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program, Proposed Standing Order Relating to 
the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information § 1.03 (2009), 
http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/Statement%20-%20Phase%20One.pdf (suggesting that parties 
use a proportionality analysis prospectively and that discovery requests “should be 
reasonably targeted, clear, and as specific as practical.”); D. Md., Suggested Protocol for 
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) ¶ 8(I),(K), 
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this analysis into something more robust. In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc., U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV 
developed an eight-factor proportionality test for e-discovery considering: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering
critical information; (3) the availability of such information from other
sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding party maintains the
requested data (5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the
information; (6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the
resources available to each party.28
What proportionality cases one can find tend to use the Rowe factors.29
Courts also have looked at slightly different factors, such as “(i) the 
number and complexity of the issues; (ii) the location, nature, number and 
availability of potentially relevant witnesses or documents; (iii) the extent of 
past working relationships between the attorney and the client, particularly in 
related or similar litigation; and (iv) the time available to conduct an 
investigation.”30 A “reasonable” search with respect to proportional discovery
“is reasonable not on some idealized notion of adequacy, but ‘reasonable under 
the circumstances.’”31 However, there is no apparent authority in rules or case
law giving adequate guidance on how to appropriately weight any of these 
factors.32
All of this examination does not add up to the widespread use of devices to 
limit discovery, however, as evidenced by a commentator’s note that: 
There thus exists a striking disconnect between the goal of proportionality 
embedded in the Federal Rules and the imbalanced reality of modern 
discovery. While not entirely a failure of the rules, this disconnect is 
https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf (requiring, in working model for 
e-discovery, that Rule 26(f) conference discussions specifically include a proportionality
analysis).
28. 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). For a full discussion of the Rowe decision,
see Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 530. 
29. Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 530; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,
217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I) (explicitly adopting the Rowe test). 
30. Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery: Reasonable Search, Proportionality, Cooperation,
and Advancing Technology, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH & PRIVACY L. 433, 437-38 (2014) 
(quoting S2 Automation, LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. CIV 11-0884 JB/WDS, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 120097, at *99-100 (D.N.M. Aug. 9, 2012)) (citing I-Med Pharma Inc. v. 
Biomatrix, Inc., Civ. No. 03-3677 (DRD), 2011 WL 6140658 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011); St. Paul 
Reins. Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000)). 
31. Bennett, supra note 30, at 437 (quoting In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust
Litig., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2012)). 
32. Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 24, at 44 (“The current Federal Rules (and
associated Advisory Committee Notes) do not give specific direction to litigants and courts 
on how to properly consider the factors listed. Litigants and courts have factors, but no 
systematic approach for breathing life into those factors and ensuring that all applicable 
factors are considered. Accordingly, we lack the benefit of coherent and predictable case 
law.”). 
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attributable in part to the failure to address proportional discovery, a concept 
that is easy to articulate in general terms, yet can be difficult to implement in 
practice.33
C. Proportionality in the 2015 Amendments: Is It Over, Did We Win?
Proportionality was once again on the move in 2015, switching back to 
Rule 26(b)(1) and a role of more prominence, establishing it as “a concept that 
is central to defining the appropriate scope of discovery.” 34 Indeed, “[t]he
committee suspected that the location of the proportionality standard, ‘buried 
among other discovery provisions, hindered its effectiveness.’”35
The new Rule 26(b)(1) states: 
[A party] may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is 
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.36
The draft Committee Note to Rule 26 explains that proportionality is the 
“collective responsibility” of the parties and the court.37
Commentators have noted that “the approach of moving the rule around, 
rather than changing its substance, suggests that, while the Advisory 
Committee understands that disproportionate discovery remains a problem for 
litigants and the courts, the Committee does not see an obvious alternative rule 
or amendment that would better address the problem.”38
Further, it has been noticed that the rule itself is shifting from the reactive 
to the prospective. That is to say that proportionality generally comes up in 
litigation when a litigant oversteps his bounds and requests discovery clearly in 
excess of a reasonable scope, at which point his adversary objects, invoking the 
proportionality rules.39 Should the parties be unable to resolve this objection,
33. Id.
34. Christopher Benning & Daniel Toal, Proportionality: Rarely Used, Primped for a
Return?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 2014 (“By moving the proportionality rule out of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(2), ‘Limitations on Frequency and Extent,’ into 26(b)(1), which is entitled ‘Scope in 
general,’ the Advisory Committee seems to be signaling to parties and judges that the 
proportionality rule should no longer be seen solely as a limit on the scope of discovery. 
Indeed, the new location confirms that that the Advisory Committee instead views 
proportionality as a concept that is central to defining the appropriate scope of discovery.”). 
35. Gelbach and Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE 
WORKING GROUP SERIES 3 (Jan. 2013)). 
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
37. Gelbach and Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 12.
38. Benning and Toal, supra note 34.
39. Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery
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the court will step in to resolve it. Thus a proportional scope is set out of 
conflict, not cooperation. The new rule would change that, encouraging parties 
and judges to take extra time and collaborate, to the extent practicable, at the 
outset of the case to set a reasonable scope for discovery. Commentators have 
noted that “[t]hus, under the proposal, proportionality—first introduced in a 
less-prominent form in the 1983 amendments to Rule 26—would take center 
stage in setting the scope of discovery.”40
The purpose of the change is, as the Chief Justice wrote, to address the 
“most serious impediments to just, speedy, and efficient resolution of civil 
disputes.”41 The Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendments hope to rally
support behind proportionality and deserve close examination. For example, 
they summarize proportionality’s FRCP journey as follows: 
Restoring proportionality as an express component of the scope of discovery 
warrants repetition of parts of the 1983 and 1993 Committee Notes that must 
not be lost from sight. The 1983 Committee Note explained that “[t]he rule 
contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus 
acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating 
basis.” The 1993 Committee Note further observed that “[t]he information 
explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of 
wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an 
instrument for delay or oppression.” What seemed an explosion in 1993 has 
been exacerbated by the advent of e-discovery. The present amendment again 
reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in the cases 
that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective party management. It is 
expected that discovery will be effectively managed by the parties in many 
cases. But there will be important occasions for judicial management, both 
when the parties are legitimately unable to resolve important differences and 
when the parties fall short of effective, cooperative management on their 
Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2223 (2014). Benham writes: 
Currently, attorneys are expected to exercise discretion to frame discovery requests within 
the scope allowed by Rule 26(b)(1), and if they fail to do so, opposing counsel can request 
limitations, or protections, from the court. Likewise, current rule 26(g) mandates that 
attorneys who sign discovery requests certify that the requests are, among other things, 
proportional. If necessary, the court then exercises its discretion to refine discovery along 
those same lines. 
 The amendments, however, would emphasize attorneys’ obligation to consider what is 
proportional when they exercise their discretion to frame discovery requests in the first place. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
40. Id. at 2222 (footnote omitted).
41. The 2015 discovery amendments were, unusually, front and center in Chief Justice
Roberts’s 2015 Year-End Report. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (Dec. 31, 2015) [hereinafter ROBERTS 2015 REPORT], 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf (“Many rules 
amendments are modest and technical, even persnickety, but the 2015 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are different. Those amendments are the product of five 
years of intense study, debate, and drafting to address the most serious impediments to just, 
speedy, and efficient resolution of civil disputes.”). The Chief Justice’s echoing of the 
language of Rule 1 is no accident. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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own.42
There’s an inherent rhetorical tension in this long passage between self-
regulating proportionality from the parties, and judicial involvement. If you 
break down the Committee’s message into simple bullet points, it reads like 
this: 
Like we said before
There will have to be close judicial involvement
Because parties cannot always keep discovery proportional
Especially now that we have to deal with Big Data.
So there needs to be close judicial involvement
In those cases where parties cannot always keep discovery
proportional
But parties can sometimes keep discovery proportional
Though sometimes they cannot keep discovery proportional
In which case there needs to be close judicial involvement
For those cases where the parties cannot keep discovery
proportional.
The analysis above cannot be much more reductionist when one puts it this 
way, but it is now easy to see the tension. Where does party autonomy stop, and 
judicial intervention begin? It reads as if the drafters want to call for increased 
judicial intervention, but do not want to have to call for such intervention. That 
is to say it would be better for everyone if the intervention were not needed, as 
judges are already overworked and cooperation between counsel should be the 
norm. However, as the data have shown, lawyers are simply not happy with the 
amount of discovery and their own ability to cooperate as both adversaries and 
partners in dispute resolution.43 If lawyers banded together and mutually
agreed to reduce proportionality at the cost of the occasional advantage in 
individual litigations, that may create a sea change. But that system only works 
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment (alteration in
original) (discussing the impact of the “information explosion” on the 1993 changes to Rule 
26). 
43. June 2014 Rules Report at B-6 to B-7.
Surveys of ABA Section of Litigation and NELA attorneys found more than 80% agreement 
that discovery costs are disproportionately high in small cases, with more than 40% of 
respondents saying they are disproportionate in large cases. In the survey of the ABA Section 
of Litigation, 78% percent [sic] of plaintiffs’ attorneys, 91% of defense attorneys, and 94% 
of mixed-practice attorneys agreed that litigation costs are not proportional to the value of 
small cases, with 33% of plaintiffs’ lawyers, 44% of defense lawyers, and 41% of mixed-
practice lawyers agreeing that litigation costs are not proportional in large cases. In the 
NELA survey, which included primarily plaintiffs’ lawyers, more than 80% said that 
litigation costs are not proportional to the value of small cases, with a fairly even split on 
whether they are proportional to the value of large cases. An IAALS survey of corporate 
counsel found 90% agreement with the proposition that discovery costs in federal court are 
not generally proportional to the needs of the case, and 80% disagreement with the 
suggestion that outcomes are driven more by the merits than by costs. In its report
summarizing the results of some of the Duke empirical research, IAALS noted that between
61% and 76% of the respondents in the ABA, ACTL, and NELA surveys agreed that judges
do not enforce the rules’ existing proportionality limitations on their own.
Id.
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as well as its worst actor, and research (as well as a 30-year history of 
proportionality struggles) suggests that a self-regulating system is unlikely to 
be effective.44
Even the drafters grudgingly admit that, as time goes by, proportionality in 
discovery increasingly requires judicial intervention. One can see such an 
admission in a memorandum by the Chair of the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stating that one of the goals of the 2015 
amendments is that: 
Case management will begin earlier, judges will be encouraged to 
communicate directly with the parties, relevant topics are emphasized for the 
initial case management conference, early Rule 34 requests will facilitate a 
more informed discussion of necessary discovery, proportionality will be 
considered by all participants, unnecessary discovery motions will be 
discouraged, and obstructive Rule 34 responses will be eliminated.45
That sounds like a win-win-win, but it is important to note that nothing in 
the Federal Rules prevents parties (or judges) from doing just that in 2012 or 
2014, making the rule change not altogether “new.” And, it has been noted that 
“attention to the proportionality provisions has grown since 1994, and 
endorsement of their use has widened.”46 However, as the rule change shows,
courts and attorneys (and especially, clients) have not seen the widespread use 
of proportionality that such attention and endorsement should engender. 
D. Why Hasn't Proportionality Caught On?
That is to say, if proportionality is so important and so useful, why is it still 
considered a “growing” trend and not a ubiquitous part of discovery?47 Why
don’t judges take the more active role contemplated by (and now almost 
required by) the rules? Scholarship shows no shortage of thoughtful reasons. 
44. Id. at B-6, stating:
Other surveys prepared for the Duke Conference showed greater dissatisfaction with the 
costs of civil discovery. In surveys of lawyers from the American College of Trial Lawyers
(ACTL), the ABA Section of Litigation, and NELA, more lawyers agreed than disagreed
with the proposition that judges do not enforce Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to limit discovery. The 
ACTL Task Force on Discovery and IAALS reported on a survey of ACTL fellows, who 
generally tend to be more experienced trial lawyers than those in other groups. A primary 
conclusion from the survey was that today’s civil litigation system takes too long and costs 
too much, resulting in some deserving cases not being filed and others being settled to avoid 
the costs of litigation. Almost half of the ACTL respondents believed that discovery is
abused in almost every case, with responses being essentially the same for both plaintiff and 
defense lawyers.
45. Id. at B-14.
46. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008.1 at 158 (3d ed. 2010).
47. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 4 (“The focus on organizational changes
in the 2014 Amendments suggests the committee continues to assume that the apparent 
shortfall in judges’ and parties’ use of the proportionality standard results partly from a lack 
of awareness of the proportionality standards’ applicability to their case.”). 
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A key problem may be that the factors in the proportionality rules are not 
weighted, making for a difficult test.48 Another problem could be that a natural 
tendency exists to use the amount in controversy as the dominant factor to 
determine proportionality. We are, after all, examining cost.49 That tendency is 
likely to be helpful in cases such as a commercial dispute among litigants on 
equal financial footing, but troublesome in cases involving significant 
nonmonetary rights such as actions to enforce constitutional or statutory 
rights.50 This is likely why “the importance of the issues at stake in the action” 
is moving to the front of the new rule and “the amount in controversy” is 
moving back. 
The most recurrent problems, however, come from three sources. First, 
proportionality of discovery, or its proper scope, must be set early on in a case, 
when facts are generally not well-known nor arguments well-developed. This 
tension can be somewhat described thusly: 
It is widely acknowledged that the proportionality rule is difficult to apply, 
particularly at the early stages of discovery. Perhaps the most widely 
acknowledged problem with the [proportionality] rule is that it requires judges 
to make, at a very early stage, estimations about the merits of a case, which 
judges are characteristically reluctant to do.51
48. Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 875-76 (“In deciding whether ‘the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,’ a court considers ‘the needs of the case, 
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.’ No particular weight is 
given to any factor. Such open-ended, multi-factor tests breed uncertainty and are subject to 
manipulation.” (footnote omitted)). 
49. Indeed, a practice note from the law firm Jones Day belies this tendency. In
discussing the adoption of the 2015 FRCP Amendments, the drafters write that “simply 
noting that the amount in controversy is large and the responding party’s resources are 
substantial is not a sufficient proportionality analysis. Rather, the benefit of the information 
requested should be weighed against the costs. Conversely, a hefty price tag does not alone 
indicate ‘disproportionality.’ All proportionality factors must be considered.” Laura E. 
Ellsworth et al., Significant Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Expected to 
Take Effect December 1, 2015: Practical Implications and What Litigators Need to Know,
JONES DAY (September 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/significant-changes-to-the-federal-
rules-of-civil-procedure-expected-to-take-effect-december-1-12015-practical-implications-
and-what-litigators-need-to-know-09-25-2015. 
50. See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL
4498465, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 887 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2010) (“Yet, with repeated judicial findings of the Defendants’ violations of children’s 
rights to medical care under federal law, any cost of ESI discovery is far outweighed by the 
benefits of the improved health of the children in this state.”] 
51. Benning & Toal, supra note 34 (footnote omitted). The authors continue:
This challenge leads to few written decisions on proportionality grounds. In fact, the lack of 
case law on the topic to assist judges in making these difficult judgments is among the factors
that perpetuate the lack of case law on the topic: Judges are even less inclined to make these 
difficult and precarious determinations when they do not have case law on which to base their 
decisions.
Id. This is so; case law on proportionality in discovery is relatively scarce. 
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This statement presupposes that the proportionality of discovery is itself an 
estimation of the merits of a case. It’s not, but one-shot discovery, with little 
recourse on appeal, can make it seem that way.52
Second, parties tend not to agree on the proper proportions of discovery, 
particularly when those proportions are tied to the “dollar value” of the claims, 
which is often the key (sometimes only) metric in play.53 So the common
perception that the system can adopt proportionality by “requir[ing] either by 
protocol or local rule that there be a discussion of proportionality before the 
discovery plan required by Rule26(f) is submitted to the court”54 is
troublesome. For judges and longtime practitioners can—and do—say that it is 
one thing to require litigants to discuss something, and another thing entirely to 
convince them to work together in good faith to reduce the scope of a lawsuit.55
That is to say that the 2015 amendments only increase emphasis on 
proportionality, instead of requiring it. Parties are still free to set the limits of 
discovery as broadly as they wish. 
It is a practice that is in some ways, to some practitioners, antithetical to 
the concept of zealous advocacy, and also a practice that, in the short term and 
for the short-sighted, takes money away from a lawyer’s accounts receivable.56
52. Dan H. Willoughby Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-
Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 797-98 (2010) (“Appellate review 
of e-discovery sanction cases has been limited, perhaps because many cases settle or are 
otherwise not appealed.”). Also, a major law firm’s yearly e-discovery update noted 
“infrequent instances where e-discovery was addressed squarely by a circuit court of 
appeals.” 2011 Mid-Year E-Discovery Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011Mid-YearE-DiscoveryUpdate.pdf. 
53. Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding Unprofessional Conduct
in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 997-98 (2009) (“Parties in litigation, especially at 
the commencement of a case when discovery plans are formed, rarely agree on the value of a 
case. This disagreement produces disputes regarding what effort is fair and reasonable under 
the circumstances.”). 
54. John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 455, 462 (2010). 
55. Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2013); Netzorg & Kern, supra note 
1, at 528 (“Attorneys are required to zealously advocate for their clients. Excessive or 
evasive discovery tactics are among the most commonly used tools to induce a favorable 
settlement—or to deter a claim altogether, depending on which side abuses the process. 
Unless and until attorneys are forced to make discovery proportionate, the abuses outlined in 
this article will continue. Guidelines, to put it bluntly, are not enough.”); Michael J. 
Hanrahan, Game-Changing Federal “Proportionality” Discovery Rule Effective December 
1, 2015, FOX, O’NEILL, SHANNON, S.C. (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.foslaw.com/news-
views/game-changing-federal-proportionality-discovery-rule-effective-december-1-2015 
(“Unending discovery becomes a settlement tactic, not an investigational tool.”). 
56. The idea that smaller discovery scope equals less money for lawyers is generally
not accurate. In the long term, an efficient lawyer will grow his client base through a 
reputation for bringing cases to resolution quickly and under budget. But the idea, however 
misguided, persists, and therefore judges and rule makers must account for it. See Patrick 
Oot et al., Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry, 87 DENV. U. L. REV 533, 
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Rules, judges, and practitioners all stress, as is just and proper, open and honest 
cooperation between parties in setting the scope of discovery and the best 
means of avoiding injustice.57 But when the law is practiced by people—not 
just people, but lawyer people—of varying degrees of reasonableness, such 
open and honest cooperation is not ubiquitous.58 Put another way, the system of 
setting proportional discovery must anticipate the uncooperative and the 
conflict-driven.
Third, and perhaps foremost, the current discovery system of set-
proportionality-and-go is an all-or-nothing proposition.59 That is to say, the 
scope of discovery is set, along with a deadline, at the beginning of a case, 
often at the Rule 16 conference. The judge sends the parties off with an order in 
hand, and, with the weariness of a parent handing the car keys to a teenager, an 
admonishment to try to solve disputes amicably this time. Discovery then 
proceeds along that scope, and adhering to that deadline, expanding scope only 
upon the showing of good cause, and extending the deadline only on agreement 
and/or judicial order.60 But the “fact period” of discovery remains an all-or-
nothing proposition: discover now or forever hold your peace.61
Practitioners note that hard discovery deadlines which cover the entirety of 
546-48, 557 (2010) (citing a “noticeable lack of positive feedback when attorney [sic] do
conduct efficient discovery,” and stating that “[t]he bar must empower itself to seek
knowledge on reasonable discovery.”).
57. See Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 3.
58. Craig Ball, E-Discovery on a Budget, 3RD ANNUAL UF LAW/EDRM ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY CONFERENCE MATERIALS (2015), http://www.edrm.net/2015-uflaw/materials 
(“Poor communication and lack of cooperation between parties on e-discovery issues 
contribute markedly to increased cost. The incentives driving transparency and cooperation 
in e-discovery are often misunderstood. You don’t communicate or cooperate with an 
opponent to help them win their case on the merits; you do it to permit the case to be 
resolved on its merits and not be derailed or made more expensive by e-discovery 
disputes.”). 
59. Oot, supra note 56, at 537 (positing that under the current discovery regime, “all
possible” relevant information becomes a money game). 
60. Karl Schieneman & Thomas C. Gricks III, The Implications of Rule 26(g) on the
Use of Technology-Assisted Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 239, 255 & n.54 (2013) (“The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, case law, and the Sedona Principles all further emphasize 
that electronic discovery should be a party-driven process.” (quoting Romero v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010))). 
61. Somewhat famously, in Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
he agreed with plaintiffs’ proposal to phase discovery, stating that had he been the district 
court judge, he would have allowed key depositions to occur before dismissing the 
complaint. 550 U.S. 544, 591-93 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Suzette M. Malveaux, 
Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the 
Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 135-36 
(2010)). Commentators have pointed to this opinion and to phasing as an answer to access-
to-justice issues inherent in heightened pleading standards. See, e.g., Ryan Mize, Comment, 
From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and 
Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1265-66 (2010) (discussing minimal phased 
discovery). 
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the discovery permissible in, and proportional to, a case are somewhat 
antithetical to “speediness,” a goal of discovery so critical it appears in Federal 
Rule No. 1. Short time periods “may actually create incentives for requesting 
parties to issue overbroad requests (for fear they will have only a single 
opportunity to make such requests).”62 This all-or-nothing system “can lead to
massive document productions—along with expensive and time-consuming 
document reviews—much of which has only tangential relevance to the merits 
of the case.”63
There is an inherent tension between a system that may be most beneficial 
for the litigants, but requires an all-or-nothing decision from lawyers not 
inclined to cooperate and operating with limited information. Taking that 
tension one step further, while there is hope that a renewed interest in discovery 
may limit discovery in some cases,64 practitioners also fear that setting
boundaries for discovery too early in the lifespan of a case, as the 2015 
amendments encourage, may create a “mini trial” of sorts in which parties will 
litigate the scope of discovery extensively, defeating the purpose of keeping 
costs low.65 Put that way, the lack of success for the proportionality rule is not
all that surprising. 
Will the amendments finally create that success? That remains to be 
62. Benning & Toal, supra note 34.
63. Id.
64. See Benham, supra note 39, at 2224-25.
Taken together, the amendments, combined with continued criticism of what some view as
overbroad discovery, may create momentum in some courts to narrow the scope of discovery 
significantly, at least as a practical matter. For some commentators, the changes are a tepid 
step toward international litigation norms. Some in practice describe the potential change as 
almost cataclysmic. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle—the scope amendments 
will substantially narrow discovery in some cases but will not, as predicted by some, end
pretrial litigation as we currently know it.
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
65. Id. at 2224 (“At a minimum, the changes could prompt a wave of discovery
disputes based on allegations that discovery requests are not proportional to the case. 
Reacting to the re-crafted scope provision, litigants and courts will undoubtedly pay more 
heed to proportionality.”); see also Gelbach and Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 18: 
Greater reliance on a judicially managed proportionality standard will involve a number of 
challenges. Will parties have the proper incentives to report the information that judges need 
to carry out proportionality analysis? Will the parties even have that information at the time 
that the standard will be applied? How will judges determine the implicit weight to place on 
nonquantifiable factors involving the importance of nonmonetary issues in a case? How good 
a job will judges do forecasting the merits value of the (yet-to-be-provided) requested 
information in question? Whatever the answers to these questions, we can expect an increase 
in the variation in adjudication due to the discretionary factors written into the 
proportionality standard. 
The result of that mini-trial will not likely be overturned on appeal, given appellate courts’ 
general deference to the trial court’s judgment in discovery disputes. See, e.g., Nat’l Hockey 
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (holding that discovery 
disputes are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, where the question is not 
whether the appellate court “would as an original matter have [acted as the trial court did]; it 
is whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in so doing.”). 
106 STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [Vol. 4:2 
seen. Months before their adoption, a federal court used its discretion to apply 
proportionality in the spirit of the 2015 amendments. In a February 2015 case, 
Adair v. EQT Production Co., a class action, the court limited discovery 
beyond a certain boundary because the burden and expense of obtaining it 
outweighed a likely benefit, citing a “yardstick of proportionality” in doing 
so.66 The court specifically cited the then-forthcoming 2015 amendments as 
guidance in formulating this limitation.67
Consider also Siriano v. Goodman Manufacturing Co.,68 one of the first 
2015 opinions using the recently-revised proportionality rule.69 This was a 
products liability case in which the defendant balked at certain discovery, 
stating that it would be unduly burdensome to review and produce.70 The 
magistrate judge stated that “‘restoring proportionality’ was the ‘touchstone of 
revised Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope of discovery provisions’ with the move of 
proportionality from Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)) to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1).”71 Finding that the discovery in question was potentially important 
albeit difficult to produce, "the Court ordered a discovery conference to discuss 
possibly conducting discovery in phases."72 The Court also charged the parties 
to “engage in further cooperative dialogue in an effort to come to an agreement 
regarding proportional discovery."73
These judges still had to use discretion, take guidance, and put forth 
substantial effort to instill proportionality in these particular cases. To that, end, 
do the 2015 amendments go far enough? Could they do more? 
II. A PROPOSED PROPORTIONALITY SOLUTION: MANDATORY PHASED
DISCOVERY
What this Article proposes is that, in many cases, judges should be 
required to create scheduling orders to require the parties to "phase" discovery. 
66. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10CV00037, 2015 WL 505650, at *5-6 (W.D. Va.
Feb. 6, 2015); Brian K. Cifuentes, Proportionality: The Continuing Effort to Limit the Scope 




68. Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 2:14-cv-1131, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165040 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015). 
69. See, e.g., Joshua Gilliland, Proportionality is like The Force, BOW TIE LAW’S
BLOG, (Dec. 22, 2015), https://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2015/12/22/proportionality-is-like-
the-force (last visited: Dec. 22, 2015). 
70. Id. (citing Siriano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *15).
71. Id. (quoting Siriano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *16).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id.(quoting Siriano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *20). The Court further
noted that Rule 1 now charges the Court and the parties with ensuring a “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Id. (quoting Siriano, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *19).  
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That is to say, at the outset of the case, the judge orders the parties to meet-and-
confer as part of their Rule 26 organizations and attempt to set a scope of 
discovery, as prescribed by the revised rules. But the proposed judicial action 
here goes much farther, in that the judge would also ask the parties to meet and 
confer with respect to the most important facts to be discovered, and the most 
important information custodians for each side. With that knowledge in hand, 
the judge would ask the parties to set a "first phase" of discovery, at the initial 
Rule 16 conference, covering only the most important discovery. Should the 
parties fail to reach an agreement, the judge would then set the scope and 
timing of the "first phase" based on submissions from the parties as to what that 
first phase should be, using the standards set by courts to set the scope of 
discovery as a guide. 
That is to say, it makes sense for judges looking for guidance in setting the 
scope of phases to look to some of the Rowe Entertainment factors for 
proportionality, specifically: (1) the likelihood of discovering critical 
information; (2) the availability of such information; (3) the purposes for which 
the responding party maintains the requested data; (4) the relative benefit to the 
parties of obtaining the information; (5) the total cost associated with 
discovery; (6) the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive 
to do so; and (7) the resources available to each party. 
At the end of this first phase of discovery, the judge would bring the 
litigants together at a subsequent “discovery” conference, which can (and 
should) double as a settlement conference.74 At this conference, the parties
would discuss whether any additional discovery is necessary, and if so, whether 
they have met and conferred so as to agree upon its scope. If the parties cannot 
agree, the judge would, at his or her discretion, set an additional phase of 
discovery. In theory, the number of phases would be unlimited; in practice it is 
likely to be a relatively low number as parties will, with any effort and luck, 
uncover the ultimate facts in a case, or at least sufficient facts in a case to 
support a resolution of the dispute.75
Indeed, nearly this exact system is contemplated by the Committee Notes 
to the 2015 Amendments: 
The parties may begin discovery without a full appreciation of the factors that 
bear on proportionality. A party requesting discovery, for example, may have 
little information about the burden or expense of responding. A party 
requested to provide discovery may have little information about the 
74. There can, but does not need to be, a determination at the outset of discovery of a
set number of phases. Judges who want to calendar cases long-term with more consistency 
might estimate a reasonable number of phases and build them into a scheduling order; other 
judges may schedule all dates but make them subject to change in the event of additional 
discovery phasing.  
75. Yablon and Landsman-Roos, supra note 15, at 742 (“A court orders phased
discovery in the hope that the information disclosed in that partial discovery will make 
further discovery unnecessary.”) 
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importance of the discovery in resolving the issues as understood by the 
requesting party. Many of these uncertainties should be addressed and reduced 
in the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference and in scheduling and pretrial 
conferences with the court.76
The driving thrust of the theory is that cases will settle early, upon 
discovery of the most important evidence. Phased discovery compels litigants 
to formally assess the strength of their case theory at pre-set benchmarks, 
during which they must evaluate the discovered material.77
That is to say, after the most important discovery in a case is complete, the 
parties should have enough sense of the admissible facts in a case to discuss 
settlement on potentially more fruitful grounds. A savvy judge could even 
entertain and decide motions in limine with respect to the most important 
evidence of a case in between phases as a way to better provide a sense to the 
parties of what may lurk ahead for them at trial. The idea of deciding a motion 
in limine on an evidentiary issue before summary judgment is a little odd but 
really should not be. After all, it is certainly helpful for summary judgment 
briefing, at the very least. It is another step toward the long-discussed 
realization that the overwhelming majority of civil cases do not go near 
adjudication at a trial.78 Rather, the cases are decided in pretrial discovery and
motion practice, as each side builds a case and shows it off in the most effective 
way possible. Settlements generally happen when one party (or more) has seen 
enough. Phased discovery and inter-phase motions in limine are ways to 
establish and decide enough of a case so that it can settle. 
A. Phasing Has Worked
Phased discovery is not new. It has been around and it works.79 That is to
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 2015 Committee Notes supra note 42, at B-40.
77. Proportionality achieves this goal, albeit somewhat less stringently. See MICHAEL 
J. HANRAHAN, Game-Changing Federal “Proportionality” Discovery Rule Effective
December 1, 2015, FOX, O’NEILL, SHANNON, S.C., (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.foslaw.com/news-views/game-changing-federal-proportionality-discovery-rule-
effective-december-1-2015 (last visited December 22, 2015) (“The new [proportionality]
standard cuts both ways. It prevents plaintiffs from using discovery to extract a ‘cost of
defense’ settlement (especially in a small case), and checks defendants’ prying into a
plaintiff’s background/finances when the yield is low.”).
78. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994); Samuel R. Gross & Kent 
D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for
Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“A trial is a failure. . . . [L]awyers, judges, and
commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than
trial.”).
79. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 30, at 457 n.103 (citing Laura Hunt, Comments:
Trending: Proportionality in Electronic Discovery in Common Law Countries and the 
United States’ Federal and State Courts, 43 UNIV. OF BALT. L. REV. 279, 298-303 (2014) 
(referring to phasing as a technique to ease discovery burdens); Matthew A. Bills, 9 Ways to 
Reduce E-discovery Costs; From the Experts, 2013 CORP. COUNS. 1, 1 (Sept. 6, 2013) 
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say, in certain exemplary instances courts and parties have purposefully placed 
their initial focus on the most important, relevant or determinative information 
first, choosing to restrict the contours of discovery to exclude other 
information, even if that information would otherwise be discoverable, 
relevant, or probative.80 Leading commentators cite it with approval.81
In Haka v. Lincoln County,82 a magistrate judge implemented phasing
when faced with a classic proportionality problem. The case, a wrongful 
termination action, involved a relatively low amount in dispute compared to the 
(“conducting discovery in phases is an effective way to reduce costs by focusing the parties’ 
time and effort on the most critical discovery at the outset”); Hon. Paul W. Grimm, The State 
of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and 
Burdens, or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules?, 12 
SEDONA CONF. J. 13 (2011) (“[The parties] can phase the discovery to focus first on a limited 
sub-set of witnesses and documents that are most likely to yield the most evidentiary ‘bang-
for-the-buck,’ while reserving the right to seek additional discovery in the future if warranted 
by what the initial discovery has disclosed.”);; Sean R. Gallagher, Bringing Proportionality 
Back into the Discovery Process: E-Discovery for the Other 97% of Us, 2013 A.B.A. SYMP.
ON TECH. & EMP. L. 1, 11 (Apr. 23, 2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2013/04/aba_national_symp
osiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/17_gallagher.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 
22, 2015) (recommending phasing so that parties can be “better positioned to target future 
discovery in a more efficient manner”); Milberg LLP, Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 33 
(Describing phasing upon agreement of counsel as an example of cooperation as a system 
that “would incorporate a schedule whereby certain tranches of information would be 
produced in sequence, and, in some instances, subject to the satisfaction of certain 
thresholds. For example, counsel for the parties might agree to initiate discovery with the 
production of information from the files of a set number of custodians, departments, or both, 
with subsequent productions of other information from other custodians or departments to be 
permitted only if certain showings are made.”). 
80. The Sedona Conference features phasing in its most recent Commentary on
Proportionality, published in 2013, in which they write: 
Under these circumstances, the court, or the parties on their own initiative, may find it 
appropriate to conduct discovery in phases, starting with discovery of clearly relevant 
information located in the most accessible and least expensive sources. Phasing discovery in 
this manner may allow the parties to develop the facts of the case sufficiently to determine 
whether, at a later date, further discovery that is more burdensome and expensive is, 
nevertheless, warranted. In addition, given that the vast majority of cases settle, phasing 
discovery may allow the parties to develop a factual record sufficient for settlement 
negotiations without incurring the costs of more burdensome discovery that may only be 
necessary if the case goes to trial. 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY,
(Jan. 2013) at 9, www.thesedonaconference.org (click “Publications” tab; then click “Sedona 
Conference Commentary© on Proportionality” under “eDiscovery”). 
81. See Losey, Predictive Coding, supra note 18, at 43:
In my opinion, electronic discovery production should almost always be conducted in phases. 
This is in accord with Sedona’s second principle of proportionality, that, in general, litigants 
should seek discovery from the most convenient, least burdensome, and least expensive 
sources. As The Sedona Conference Proportionality Commentary indicates, parties should 
always focus first on the low-hanging fruit. In other words, they should focus first on 
evidence that is likely to have the most probative value and that is the most easily accessible.
(citing SEDONA, COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY (2013), supra note 80, at 8–9). 
82. Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D 577 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
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cost of reviewing the ESI. Faced with a classic proportionality problem, the 
magistrate judge went through the factors set forth in the existing Rule 
26(b)(2)(C), seeming to struggle somewhat with balancing the monetary aspect 
of the case with the recognition that it involves a violation of important rights 
for the plaintiff.83 It was clear that the cost to review and produce ESI would 
near the amount in dispute somewhat quickly. The magistrate judge recognized 
that neither party “ha[d] deep pockets.”84 Here, phasing and proportionality 
provided the solution: 
Having considered all the relevant factors, I conclude that fairness and 
efficiency require the parties to proceed incrementally, limiting the initial 
search to the e-mails stored on the hard drives. Plaintiff is required to narrow 
his search terms to the narrowest set with which he is comfortable. Any 
additional searches shall occur only by joint agreement or court order.85
The costs of additional phases of discovery were to be split between the 
parties equally. This case is a great example of an “easy” phasing case; the 
discovery costs would have turned it into a “nuisance settlement,” and the 
interests of fairness dictated at least taking a chance at finding the most 
important evidence in a first phase. 
Haka was an easy case. In a somewhat harder case, Mancia v. Mayflower 
Textile Services Co.,86 a FLSA case, then-Magistrate Judge Grimm noted that
given the potential amounts in controversy plaintiff’s requested discovery 
“might be excessive or overly burdensome,” but he lacked sufficient 
information to make an informed ruling on that theory.87 Thus, the parties were
asked to estimate the potential damages, with zero being the best case scenario 
for defendants, and with plaintiffs calculating the worst case scenario for 
defendants.88 Then-Magistrate Judge Grimm noted that “[w]hile admittedly a
rough estimate, this range is useful for determining what the ‘amount in 
controversy’ is in the case, and what is ‘at stake’ for purposes of Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)'s proportionality analysis89 The purpose of this exercise was to
help the parties set a proportional budget for discovery.90 In doing so, then-
Magistrate Judge Grimm recommended phasing discovery, which would, inter 
alia, "enable Plaintiffs to reevaluate their needs depending on the information 
already provided.”91 The judge stressed that the parties’ collaborations on
83. Id. at 579 (“Although the issues at stake in this lawsuit are important, the potential
damages are low, so that the cost of engaging in the ESI search plaintiff needs is 
disproportionate to the available recovery.”). 
84. Id.
85. Id.





91. Id. at 365.
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phase discovery would result, for the defendants, in “having to produce less 
discovery, at lower cost,” and for  the plaintiffs, “in getting helpful information 
more quickly.”92 Both parties would save money, and in negotiating the phases
of discovery, the judge surmised that this process would “expedit[e] the time 
when the case may be resolved on its merits, or settled.”93
Why phasing would expedite resolution is not answered in the opinion but 
seems based on the idea that getting more discovery sooner and cheaper will 
facilitate settlement.94 But this opinion also suggests another benefit that is less
obvious: that through negotiating phases, the parties will learn the strengths and 
weaknesses of both cases, which can bring about a settlement as well.95
In another well-cited case, Barrerra v. Boughton,96 defendants accused of
racial profiling dug in against allegedly overbroad discovery requests from a 
plaintiff that included forty custodians, an eighty-keyword search, and an 
allegedly expansive date range.97 The defendants cited unduly burdensome
costs for such a large, one-shot discovery and proposed an initial phase of three 
custodians over a limited date range.98 Plaintiffs refused to phase discovery, or
perhaps, put more diplomatically by the court, plaintiffs “could not agree” on a 
first phase.99 The court sided with defendants, and ordered the parties to
attempt a first phase of discovery along the lines proposed by defendants.100 At
the time, commentators noted that “[t]he Court’s order for phased discovery 
highlights a practical approach in searches of multiple custodians.”101
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Judge Grimm expressly states this point. See Grimm, The State of Discovery,
supra note 79, at 23 (“Judges who have ordered phased discovery, focusing first on that 
which is most likely to reveal the most relevant information, permitting the parties to seek 
additional discovery later (albeit with the possibility of cost-shifting), have found that they 
seldom return for more. Rather, they cooperate in identifying key inquiries and information 
and the most efficient means to discover it. If the parties then find that they must seek 
additional discovery, that request is generally based on a far more accurate showing of 
need.”). 
95. See, e.g., Milberg LLP, Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 9 n.26 (citing Judge
Posner that “A full exchange of the information . . . enabl[es] each party to form a more 
accurate, and generally therefore a more convergent, estimate of the likely [case] outcome.”
RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (6th ed. 2003). Most cases never go to 
trial, so a settlement is essentially inevitable. See Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A 
Problem in Need of Solution?, 79 CONN. B.J. 1 (2005).  
96. Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436, 2010 WL 3926070, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept.
30, 2010). 




101. Joshua Gilliland, Phased Discovery: Undue Burden and Practical
Proportionality,BOW TIE LAW’S BLOG, (Oct. 7, 2010), 
https://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2010/10/07/phased-discovery-undue-burden-and-practical-
proportionality (Last visited: December 22, 2015). 
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Perhaps the most well-known example of phasing is that in place for cases 
before Judge Paul Grimm in the United States District Court of Maryland.102
Grimm plainly states that he requires a two-step phasing of discovery in his 
cases because “Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c) and 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) require that 
discovery in civil cases be proportional to what is at issue in the case, and 
require the Court, upon motion or on its own, to limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery otherwise allowed to ensure that discovery is proportional.”103
Grimm requires a first phase that is different from that described in this 
article:
Phase 1 Discovery. The first phase of discovery should focus on the facts that 
are most important to resolving the case, whether by trial, settlement or 
dispositive motion. Accordingly, the parties’ Phase 1 Discovery may seek 
facts that are not privileged or work product protected, and that are likely to be 
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and material to proof of 
claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. Phase 1 Discovery is intended to 
be narrower than the general scope of discovery stated in Rule 26(b)(1) 
(“discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense,” even if not admissible, if “reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence”).104
Here Judge Grimm contemplates the most important discovery first, and an 
initial scope narrower than the current “one shot” discovery.105 This is very
similar to the phasing discussed in this article. However, he does require that 
the first phase material discovery be “material to proof of claims and defenses 
raised in the pleadings.” This limitation is commonsensical but may make the 
first phase too narrow. First, it adds a bar to the first phase that provides an 
opportunity for parties to fight as to whether certain discovery is sufficiently 
“material” as to be included in the first phase. If the parties were to believe 
certain facts that could bear on settlement may not necessarily be material to 
claims and defenses raised in the pleadings, but want to include them in the 
first phase, it makes sense to do so. 
Grimm’s second phase creates somewhat of an all-or-nothing discovery: 
Phase 2 Discovery. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the Court, upon a 
showing of good cause, may permit discovery beyond that obtained under 
Phase 1 Discovery. In Phase 2 Discovery, the parties may seek discovery of 
facts that are not privileged or work product protected, are relevant to the 
claims and defenses pleaded or more generally to the subject matter of the 
litigation, and are not necessarily admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, but are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. A 
102. See Judge Paul Grimm, “Discovery Order,” United States District Court, District
of Maryland, available at:  
https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/Judge%20Grimm%20Discovery%20Order.pdf 
(Last visited: December 22, 2015). 
103. Id.
104. Id. at ¶ 2(a) (emphasis omitted).
105. Id.
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showing of good cause must demonstrate that any additional discovery would 
be proportional to the issues at stake in the litigation, taking into consideration 
the costs already incurred during Phase 1 Discovery and the factors stated in 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)– (iii). If the Court determines that additional discovery is 
appropriate, the Requesting Party will be required to show cause why it should 
not be ordered to pay all or a part of the cost of the additional discovery 
sought.106
Judge Grimm’s second phase is optional, and any discovery therein must 
survive a showing of good cause not only that the discovery would be 
proportional, given the costs already expended, but that costs of that discovery 
should not be charged to the requesting party.  While certainly effective at 
countering potential abuse, the scope of this phase does lend itself to making 
discovery more of an “all or nothing” endeavor in the first phase. A party must 
set the first phase knowing that it risks bearing the full expense of such 
discovery if it cannot convince Judge Grimm that costs should be shared. 
The system of phasing proposed by this article is not as strict, though a 
judge certainly could (and in some cases, should) fashion such restrictiveness 
into subsequent phases. For example, a third or fourth phase in discovery 
almost certainly should carry with it some measure of cost shifting, and/or be 
limited in scope. 
B. Phasing Fits Within the Rules
Commentators have often described phasing as a natural technique to 
implement the proportionality concept, particularly in large volume cases.107
“Properly used, the proportionality tools available under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure can go a long way toward reaching the long sought-after goal 
106. Id. at ¶ 2(b) (emphasis omitted).
107. See Carroll, supra note 54, at 460-61; see also Tonia Hap Murphy, Mandating Use
of Predictive Coding in Electronic Discovery: An Ill-Advised Judicial Intrusion, 50 AM.
BUS. L.J. 609, 647-48 (2013): 
While FRCP Rule 26(b) explicitly grants courts the power to “limit” discovery, case law 
shows that courts have imposed “limitations” to address proportionality problems, in cases 
where the requested discovery was overly burdensome or costly, given the nature of the case 
or the value of the information likely to be gained. This is consistent with the advisory 
committee notes accompanying this rule. Orders to limit the number of interrogatories, limit 
the universe of ESI to be examined, or phase discovery fit the plain meaning of the word 
“limit.” Ordering a party to employ a different technology to search its own ESI would be 
unlike those sorts of limitations and does not go to a concern about proportionality. Such an 
order would not naturally be regarded as a “reduction” or “restriction” of discovery. 
Phasing is also found in the prior rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s 
notes to 2006 amendment (noting that, “because the court and parties may know little about 
what information the sources identified as not reasonably accessible might contain, whether 
it is relevant, or how valuable it may be to the litigation,” it may be appropriate for the 
parties to engage in “focused discovery . . . to learn more about what burdens and costs are 
involved in accessing the information, what the information consists of, and how valuable it 
is for the litigation in light of information that can be obtained by exhausting other 
opportunities for discovery.”). 
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of Rule 1: securing the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.’”108 Indeed, the purpose of phased discovery is to bring 
suits to an end as fast as possible; as one commentator writes, “a court orders 
phased discovery in the hope that the information disclosed in that partial 
discovery will make further discovery unnecessary.”109 The end goal of 
phasing is quicker settlements, which goes to the heart of the cost-of-discovery 
versus cost-of-litigation problem. 
Of course, much of the past scholarship has viewed phasing as an optional
tool that litigants can use to meet the goal of proportional discovery. The new 
rule suggests that the tool is not so optional, but does not seem to require much 
more than an awareness or conversation about the scope of discovery. What is 
proposed here is more radical; here a judge requires the parties to phase 
discovery, whether the attorneys want to or not. 
Judges would retain their discretion to determine (or better yet, allow 
parties to determine) what discovery fits into each phase. For example, in many 
cases, a first phase dedicated to evidence of liability would be appropriate 
before a second phase dedicated to evidence of damages. Similarly, a case 
might be split into phases that track the key legal requirements of each claim. A 
breach of contract case, for example, might proceed with discovery regarding 
an existence of contract, then a phase regarding a breach, and so forth. 
Another potential benefit of phasing is that it adds “teeth” to the exercise in 
which litigants must cooperate to achieve a common goal. The conversation 
and awareness required by the revised rule now has a set outcome; the parties 
know that discovery will be limited in the short term.110
Further, phasing sets a potentially more reasonable goal in that litigants do 
not have to agree on the total scope of discovery at the outset of a case; rather 
they must agree on the most important discovery, to be covered first.111 Of 
course, one could argue that the more specific the goal of a consensus, the more 
difficult it is to obtain.112
108. Carroll, supra note 54, at 461.
109. See Yablon and Landsman-Roos, supra note 15, at 742; see also Tamburo v.
Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (ordering 
phased discovery so as to keep discovery proportional and bring about a speedy resolution to 
a case, specifically “to ensure that discovery is proportional to the specific circumstances of 
this case and to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action . . . .”). 
110. See, e.g., Grimm, supra note 102, at ¶ 3 (“[T]he parties and counsel are expected
to work cooperatively during all aspects of discovery to ensure that the costs of discovery are 
proportional to what is at issue in the case . . . .”). 
111. See SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY, supra note 80, at 9 (“Parties who wish to
conduct phased discovery must communicate with one another about the issues relevant to 
the litigation and the repositories—both accessible and inaccessible—that may contain 
relevant information. Moreover, the parties must cooperate with one another to prepare and 
propose to the court a phased discovery plan.”). 
112. It is relatively easy to obtain consensus among a group of hungry people that pizza
should be ordered; agreeing on toppings is another story. 
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However once again, a rule should not be disregarded simply because it is 
difficult to follow. Difficult times require difficult rules. There is much support 
for the notion that increased cooperation amongst opposing counsel and parties 
in discovery is absolutely essential to the sustainability of the discovery process 
in light of big data.113 As admitted herein, there simply are not enough judicial
resources to carefully monitor each and every case from a granular discovery 
perspective. Phasing—like all discovery—therefore cannot work effectively 
without consistent and effective cooperation among counsel.114
Provided such cooperation exists, phasing carries the added benefit of 
providing a mechanism for the parties to agree on the key issues in the case. 
This is not far from an existing requirement of Rule 26(f)(2) that is often 
overlooked by commentators and certainly by counsel, in that the parties must, 
as part of their Rule 26 conference, “consider the nature and basis of their 
claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the 
case.”115 Agreeing on the most important discovery in a case so as to set phase
one of discovery in a mutually agreed fashion requires the parties to consider 
the nature and basis of claims and defenses, and to a limited extent, share them 
with the other side. This agreement can only help settlement, even if it ruins 
tactical plans and “hide the ball” games. 
By creating a greater, more collaborative dialogue, parties move ever 
closer to agreeing on a resolution of the lawsuit; given the statistics with 
respect to cases settling versus going to trial, this resolution can be called 
nearly inevitable. In this sense phasing is more than idealistic; it is pragmatic, 
as it speeds cases along to their likely conclusion at a settlement table. 
III. WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO WRONG? EXAMINING THE
COUNTERARGUMENTS
Mandatory phasing lends itself to a certain amount of criticism, mainly of 
the “what if?” variety. Part III of this Article discusses these potential criticisms 
and examines whether they are real or paper tigers. 
It would be easy to dismiss all criticism of phased discovery to be a 
kneejerk reaction borne of inertia. After all, for many years, discovery has 
generally been a one-phase, one-shot at the truth with all information 
reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence in the boat. Stepping 
113. For a good survey of this point, see Bennett, supra note 30, at 441-45.
114. Professor Steven Gensler, in an essay, describes cooperation among counsel with
an analogy of a dartboard with a bulls-eye, where the outer rings are the bare minimum 
cooperation required by civility, and the middle rings are an honest and forthright sense of 
collaboration among counsel to bring about an efficient resolution of the dispute. See 
Scheindlin & Capra, supra note 9, at 273. He cites phased discovery as an example of 
cooperation in the bulls-eye, as an example of the highest level of cooperation, and one 
towards which attorneys should strive. Id. 
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
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away from that system to a phased discovery system requires a leap of logic 
that resembles a leap of faith: an admission that all information that is 
tangentially relevant to a case is flat out unnecessary to obtain a satisfactory 
resolution of a dispute, even after trial.116 Once this philosophical hurdle is 
overcome, there are several potential issues with compulsory phased discovery 
worth examining: 
First, it could be said that phased discovery stretches already thin
judicial resources, particularly in cases where the parties cannot agree
to the scope of the phases.
Next, phased discovery may obfuscate a “drop dead” end date for
discovery, which complicates court calendars and litigant
expectations.
Further, phased discovery brings added deadlines and calendaring,
and so may lengthen cases, particularly because legal work often
expands to fit the time required for its completion.
Similarly, a dishonest litigant could misuse phased discovery to drag
out a case, creating added cost and waste.
More practically, splitting discovery into phases may create
redundancy as parties “go back over” prior discovery and, in some
cases, need to re-depose witnesses.
Lastly, phased discovery may be hard to implement in cases where
intangible constitutional rights are at stake and the most important
evidence may be less clear.
This section describes each stated issue in turn. 
A. “Phased Discovery Stretches Judicial Resources Too Thin”
The genesis of this criticism is a legal truism: the more judges have to 
oversee, the more work it takes for them to provide oversight.117 Phased
116. See Carroll, supra note 54, at 459 (citing In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 108
F.R.D. 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)): 
 [The 1983] amendments formally interred any argument that discovery should be a free form 
exercise conducted in a free for all spirit. Discovery is not now and never was free. 
Discovery is expensive. The drafters of the 1983 amendments to sections (b) and (g) of Rule 
26 formally recognized that fact by superimposing the concept of proportionality on all 
behavior in the discovery arena. It is no longer sufficient, as a precondition for conducting 
discovery, to show that the information sought “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.” After satisfying this threshold requirement counsel also 
must make a common sense determination, taking into account all the circumstances, that the 
information sought is of sufficient potential significance to justify the burden the discovery 
probe would impose, that the discovery tool selected is the most efficacious of the means that 
might be used to acquire the desired information (taking into account cost effectiveness and 
the nature of the information being sought), and that the timing of the probe is sensible, i.e., 
that there is no other juncture in the pretrial period when there would be a clearly happier 
balance between the benefit derived from and the burdens imposed by the particular 
discovery effort. 
117. This oversight is proper, in that courts have broad case management authority. See
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discovery can, and should, operate with little judicial intervention, just like the 
current system of proportional discovery. But the statistics, common 
perception, and scholarship all agree that proportional discovery is not working 
that way, meaning that judicial intervention may need to become more 
prevalent in a mandatory phased system. 
But how much oversight would a phased discovery system require? Setting 
a first phase of discovery with or without consensus of the parties would 
require no more additional work from a chambers than setting a proportional 
scope as required by the 2015 amendments to the discovery rules. The 
additional work occurs later in discovery when, instead of managing the end of 
a discovery period that is all-encompassing, the judge is managing the end of a 
discovery period that may continue into the future.118 The judge would then be
determining what discovery, if any, should be part of the next phase. This 
activity itself is not much different than a case ongoing today in which a single-
phase discovery period is about to end, and a litigant is arguing that because of 
recently-discovered facts, “hide the ball” misconduct, or temporal limitations 
that the discovery period be extended and/or the scope of discovery heightened. 
In other words, many complex litigations today are multi-phase cases; they just 
look like single-phase cases in which the sole fact discovery deadline is 
“kicked” one or more times.119
It is certainly possible that in some instances a party will argue for a 
tranche of information to be included in Phase one of discovery, not get their 
way, and just plunge forward with that discovery in Phase one, requiring 
limited judicial intervention to put an end to such transgression. In this sense a 
savvy judge will assist the parties in setting phases, then utilize a magistrate or 
discovery master for “problem” cases, as extensive judicial oversight may be 
difficult.120
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F) (courts’ broad authority over timing of discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 
16(c)(2)(E) (timing of summary judgment motions).  
118. Indeed, this “extra work” often happens anyway. See SEDONA CONFERENCE
COMMENTARY, supra note 80, at 12 (“[C]ourts generally consider extrinsic information 
submitted by the parties to determine whether requested discovery is sufficiently important 
to warrant potentially burdensome or expensive discovery. Such evidence may include the 
parties’ opinions regarding the likely importance of the requested information, whether the 
requested information was created by ‘key players,’ whether prior discovery permits an 
inference that the requested information is likely to be important, whether the creation of the 
information requested was contemporaneous with key facts in the case, and whether the 
information requested is unique.”). 
119. Experienced litigators know that, in most cases, it is not difficult to “kick” a
discovery deadline. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4), for a party to secure modification of the 
scheduling order, it must demonstrate good cause and obtain the judge’s consent. To meet 
the good cause standard, the party must show that, despite its diligence, it could not 
reasonably have met the scheduling order deadline. See S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust 
Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003). 
120. William Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation,
64 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 903 (2015) (“Parties should be provided tools to reduce discovery 
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Will it require more work than the emphasized proportional 
discovery under the 2015 amendments? Perhaps not. After all, the 
amendments clearly contemplate a judge setting limits on discovery that 
are narrower than the current broad scope. Further, the hope of phased 
discovery is that it results in less discovery, less disruption, and quicker 
settlements. If it works as it should in the aggregate, the reduction in judicial 
work on the cases for which it works should outweigh the increase in judicial 
work for “problem” cases. 
Further, the Chief Justice has strongly suggested that judges need to 
spend more time managing discovery: 
[Under the 2015 amendments] [j]udges must be willing to take on a 
stewardship role, managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing 
parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of litigation. Faced 
with crushing dockets, judges can be tempted to postpone engagement in 
pretrial activities. Experience has shown, however, that judges who are 
knowledgeable, actively engaged, and accessible early in the process are far 
more effective in resolving cases fairly and efficiently, because they can 
identify the critical issues, determine the appropriate breadth of discovery, and 
curtail dilatory tactics, gamesmanship, and procedural posturing.121
Even if phasing does create an extra workload for judges, such, unfortunately, 
is the reality of modern litigation. 
B. “Phased Discovery Creates Discovery Without End”
There is a perceived advantage in single-stage discovery: a “hard” 
discovery deadline date, held by a strong-handed judge, will result in time- and 
content-certainty to discovery not present in a multi-phase system. A phased 
discovery, one could argue, lacks that benefit. Since nobody will know when 
discovery will actually end, nobody will know when the trial will be. Since no 
litigant can effectively budget for the great unknown, no litigant can effectively 
set a meaningful settlement figure. Thus phased discovery becomes a war 
without end that actually drags on and is more, not less, expensive. Also, the 
concern is that phase discovery may make it hard for judges and parties to 
know from the outset of a case how involved subsequent phases of discovery 
will be such that setting a trial date may be hard. 
However, as described above, in many instances, many complex litigations 
today suffer from extended discovery deadlines due to logistical issues, newly-
discovered facts, and tomfoolery. 122
costs because active judicial oversight of discovery, although widely praised as highly 
effective, rarely occurs.”). 
121. ROBERTS 2015 REPORT, supra note 41, at 7, 10.
122. For example, in Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied American Street,
LP, 28 A.3d 916, 925-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) the Pennsylvania Superior Court referred to 
hard discovery deadlines as tantamount to termination of the action, and urged trial courts to 
be lenient in granting extensions.  
Spring 2016] OCCAM'S PHASER 119 
Setting a trial date has long been recognized as a way to keep litigation 
moving, and foment settlement,123 but multi-phase discovery does not prevent
a judge from setting a trial date. It merely means that the judge should consider 
additional phases of discovery into the schedule before setting it. This situation 
can, and should, mean that a case that ordinarily may require four months of 
discovery has a first phase set with a deadline two months out, with the 
expectation that further phases may, but need not, follow. Therefore, the 
schedule in a multi-phased case is, at the end, the same schedule as before, but 
with fact discovery split into separate segments. Therefore, the trial date can be 
set at the outset of the case with some manner of certainty. 
Lastly, any lack of certainty caused by the specter of endless phases of 
discovery can be offset by the entire point of phased discovery in the first 
place: that after the most important discovery in a case is complete, the parties 
get enough of a sense of the admissible facts in a case to settle the whole 
mess.124 There should be an inherent offsetting value in that proposition.
All of this is not to deny that, in certain cases, phased discovery will 
provide some uncertainty. That is why the theory articulated by this Article is 
to keep phasing strongly recommended, but ultimately optional. There are 
certain cases in which phased discovery may not be appropriate. These cases 
will be discussed more specifically in section 7. 
C. “Phased Discovery Will Take Too Long and Cost Too Much”
The next criticism of phased discovery is that phased discovery equals a 
longer discovery period, and a case with a longer discovery period will cost 
more money because it takes longer to resolve. Key to this criticism is the 
observation that legal work is particularly susceptible to “Parkinson’s Law,” 
which, as propounded by the twentieth-century British scholar C. Northcote 
Parkinson, states, “work expands to fill the time available for its 
completion.”125
Critics of the billable hour have long said that its underlying premise lends 
itself to inefficiency, among many other dubious characteristics.126 That is to
123. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 576 n. 17 (2013) (citing Malinda M. Sanders, Settlement 
on the Courthouse Steps, 61 BENCH & B. MINN. 16 (Sept. 2004) (referring to the common 
sentiment that “I know that the pressure of an imminent trial date sometimes has more 
influence over parties’ decision to settle than any other factor”)). 
124. Again, phased discovery works. See Section II.1 supra and accompanying notes.
125. Parkinson’s Law, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/parkinson-s-law (last visited Dec. 22, 2015). 
126. Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems
and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 180-81 (2005); Steven J. Harper, The 
Tyranny of the Billable Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/opinion/the-case-against-the-law-firm-billable-
hour.html. 
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say that there is an economic incentive for a lawyer to spend just as much time 
as practicable—but not too much—on any given task, matter, or client.127 Or as 
put more fully: 
Under a law firm budget based upon billable hours, the best way to increase 
revenue is either to increase the billing rate or increase the number of hours 
billed. As competition among law firms has increased over the years, the 
ability to raise rates has depended largely upon the economy. The classic 
supply-and-demand model dictates that raising rates far above what is 
generally charged in the marketplace will reduce demand for services by that 
practitioner. With rate increases limited by such economic influences, law 
firms desiring to increase their revenues resort to increasing the number of 
hours billed. The result of increasing the number of hours billed, however, 
heightens ethical dilemmas for the profession.128
One gets the idea, if politely put. This expansion of work may not be 
entirely the practice of dishonest lawyers; uninformed, stressed out lawyers 
may participate as well.129
That is, however, the more salacious way to present this issue. The more 
mundane way involves accounting for “catch-up” time. That is to say, billable 
legal work in which an attorney reacquaints herself with the facts of a case 
and/or catches up a colleague, temporary replacement, or permanent 
replacement.130 Longer running cases mean more “catch-up time,” which is
inefficient.131 And if under a phasing scheme cases contain the same amount of
discovery, just spread out over more time, the cost criticism holds some water. 
Ultimately the frustration inherent in this particular issue is one that 
expands beyond phasing, beyond proportionality, and in a sense beyond 
127. Katherine L. Brown & Kristin A. Mendoza, Ending the Tyranny of the Billable
Hour: A Mandate for Change for the 21st Century Law Firm, 51 N.H. B.J. 66, 67 (2010). 
128. Id.
129. Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures of Billable Hours: Lessons
from a Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 619, 624 n.31
(2011) (citing Jesse Nelman, A Little Trust Can Go a Long Way Toward Saving the Billable 
Hour, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 717, 722 (2010) (“[A]busive billing may actually be the 
result of both billing ignorance and poor billing judgment, which are sustained by an 
environmental pressure for lawyers to conform to the unethical billing practices of their 
colleagues. Put simply, lawyers may not know the practices they employ are unethical.”)).  
130. It should be noted that phased discovery may well be unfairly harsh to third
parties, given that they generally are involved in cases due to matters outside of their control 
and stand to gain little from the exercise of responding to subpoenas. See Amy Pomerantz 
Nickerson, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment: Toward a Heightened 
Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 882 (2010) (noting that “in many cases the 
third party will often have little connection to the underlying action”). Therefore it may be 
prudent to not phase third-party discovery, allowing third parties in some instances to do one 
fell swoop of a collection rather than be pulled into a case on numerous occasions.  
131. See, e.g., The Washington Economics Group, Inc., The Economic Impacts of
Delays in Civil Trials in Florida’s State Courts Due to Under-Funding,  FLA. B. ASS’N
WEBSITE, Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/1C1C563F8CAFFC2C8525
753E005573FF/$FILE/WashingtonGroup.pdf.  
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discovery. This problem can be recast as being more about the modern efficacy 
of a billable hour system of potentially unlimited expense and revenue as the 
standard means by which clients pay for litigation. Such a system will 
inherently lend itself to use by good and bad actors, as well as those in 
between.132 And the billable hour system, while certainly trending down in
popularity, will not disappear overnight.133 While it is certainly a “dodge” to
conclude that Parkinson’s Law is a billable hour problem and not a phased 
discovery problem, it is certainly worth consideration as a mitigating factor. 
Phased discovery does work better in a system with spending limits.134
Lastly, this is a problem mitigated once again by the whole purpose of 
phased discovery; phased discovery should mean less discovery, in which case 
costs ought to be lower. If a phased discovery case takes longer for a period of 
three phases with ten depositions and 100,000 produced documents, at which 
point it settles with some discovery still outstanding, that case will likely still 
be cheaper than the same case in a shorter one-phase regime with twenty 
depositions and 200,000 documents. 
D. “A Dishonest Litigant Could Misuse Phased Discovery”
Discovery misconduct is an unfortunate byproduct of a legal system so 
large and complicated that it must rely on the unsupervised cooperation of 
adversaries. It will not go away no matter what the rules are or become. 
That being said, it is worth examining whether phased discovery makes 
discovery misconduct more likely, which would be a consideration in its 
effectiveness. The types of discovery misconduct generally are serving 
unnecessary discovery, failing to cooperate in scheduling or administering 
discovery, failing to respond to discovery altogether, and withholding or 
concealing key evidence.135 Motives for discovery misconduct run the gamut.
A bad lawyer plays fast and loose with discovery for many reasons, including 
132. See Brown & Mendoza, supra note 127, at 67; Douglas McCollam, The Billable
Hour: Are Its Days Numbered?, THE AM. LAW., Nov. 28, 2005, 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=900005441810/The-Billable-Hour-Are-Its-Days-
Numbered?slreturn=20160408203026.  
133. See PAUL M. BARRET, How Billable Hours Changes the Legal Professon,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 4, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
12-04/how-billable-hours-changed-the-legal-profession, (Explaining that the billable hour 
remains popular despite common distaste because “[i]t gives clients some basis for auditing 
how they’re being billed, and it rewards richly those attorneys who find ways to keep the 
meter running.”). 
134. Indeed, phased discovery works well within one commentator’s discovery cost
solution of assigning a “litigation budget” or “cap” to spending in a litigation. See Tidmarsh, 
supra note 3.   
135. See, e.g., David A. Grenardo, Tales from the Abyss: What Does it Take to Get
Disbarred These Days? (ABA Section of Litigation Joint Committees’ CLE Seminar, 
Jan. 19-21, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114594] (2012), Social Sciences Research 
Network 2114594  
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(but by no means limited to) because his case is bad;136 because he is too busy 
to effectively participate in the matter; because he is a jerk; or because his 
client demands it.137 Many techniques and motives act directly or collaterally 
as means to delay a lawsuit and make it more costly for an opponent, a nasty 
business that makes the lawsuit more costly for the court as well. 
Since the result of phased discovery may mean elongated discovery, but of 
a lesser scope, it does seem as if potential misconduct is an issue. First, the bad 
actor will almost certainly argue for the largest possible discovery scope, 
regardless of propriety. More discovery equals more money spent. The 
increased emphasis on proportionality in the 2015 amendments brings the 
discussion of proportionality out of the parties’ initial conference, where this 
foolishness would first surface, and puts it before a judge, where this 
foolishness can be curtailed.138 Phased discovery preserves this additional 
oversight and enhances it by requiring the parties and judge to agree on even 
more aspects of discovery. 
In a phased system the parties and the judge are not just agreeing on the 
outer boundaries of what is discoverable. They are agreeing on the identity of 
the most important information to be discovered and the method of obtaining 
that information at the lowest possible cost. Foolishness in the face of this 
process will be more difficult to sustain than it was in 2014.139
E. “Phased Discovery Will Force a Single Witness to Endure Multiple
Depositions”
It is likely that a multi-phased discovery process would result in the re-
deposition of key witnesses. “Non-overlapping” is key, as Rule 26(b)(1) 
prohibits discovery that is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.” 
Although there are no specific limitations on the number of times a person 
can be deposed, courts tend not to favor repeat depositions absent a compelling 
reason to order them.140 Such compelling reasons usually involve newly
136. As Edward Bennett Williams is said to have said, “A continuance is the same thing
as an acquittal, it just doesn’t last as long.” See, e.g., Elaine McCardle, HLS Negotiation 
Workshop Hosted Robert Barnett, and Jack and Suzy Welch, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 27, 
2009), http://today.law.harvard.edu/hls-negotiation-workshop-hosted-robert-barnett-and-
jack-and-suzy-welch.   
137. See Grenardo, supra note 135.
138. Indeed, that is exactly what the Chief Justice would like to see happen. See
ROBERTS 2015 REPORT, supra note 41, at 7 (“The amended rules accordingly emphasize the 
crucial role of federal judges in engaging in early and effective case management.”). 
139. See Girard & Espinosa, supra note 17; Michael Murphy, Proposed Federal Rules
Will Discourage Document Dumps, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202635329141/Proposed-Federal-Rules-Will-
Discourage-Document-Dumps?slreturn=20151108212029.  
140. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Lasko Products, Inc., No. 01 C 7867, 2003 WL
1220254 *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2003) (finding that the court is “generally opposed to 
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discovered or unreasonably withheld evidence.141
In a phased discovery model, however, re-depositions could occur without 
newly discovered or withheld evidence. Rather, they would be a necessary fact-
gathering mechanism in cases where the discovery phases tracked key areas of 
the parties’ legal theories, such as a liability phase one versus a damages phase 
two. 
Some courts have concluded that the hardship of re-deposition, especially 
for key witnesses, is not so great as to make it anathematic to discovery.142
Nevertheless, a re-deposition in phased discovery is certainly a possibility, and 
the difficult or expensive availability of a witness should be a factor in setting 
the scope of each phase. 
F. “Phased Discovery Will Bring About Serial Summary Judgment
Motions”
Particularly in instances in which discovery phases track the legal 
cornerstones of a complaint, it is easy to see a situation in which an aggressive 
litigant would take several “cracks” at summary judgment. 
For example, if a case for breach of contract were split into phases that 
tracked the elements of a breach of contract claim, with the first phase 
dedicated to evidence of a contract, and so forth, it is possible that a wily 
defendant will make serial motions for summary judgment after every phase in 
an effort to: (a) drive up costs for other parties and (b) take every opportunity to 
exit the case. 
The Federal Rules do not preclude serial summary judgment motions, 
though judges discourage them.143 A trial court has discretion over how such
motions can be brought. Therefore, judges can hedge against this situation 
simply by choosing not to consider dispositive motions until discovery is fully 
complete, and suggesting (as some already do) that serial dispositive motions 
are disfavored.144
redeposing witnesses absent a clear showing of substantial need by the movant”); 
Graebner v. James River Corp., 130 F.R.D. 440, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
141. Graebner, 130 F.R.D. at 441.
142. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Hussman Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (ordering
re-deposition of witnesses). 
143. See, e.g., Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., No. 1:14-cv-1734-
WTL-DML, 2015 WL 4523514, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2015) (admonishing litigant for 
bringing multiple summary judgment motions).  
144. For example, the Southern District of Indiana has amended its Uniform Case
Management Plan to include the following language regarding summary judgment motions: 
“[a]bsent leave of court, and for good cause shown, all issues raised on summary judgment 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 must be raised by a party in a single motion.” Uniform Case 
Management Plan, 7 http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/case-management-plans; see also, e.g.,
Order at 3, Cooper v. Shelby County (No. 07-2283 STA\cgc) (W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2010), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-tnwd-2_07-cv-02283/pdf/USCOURTS-tnwd-
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G. “Phased Discovery Is Only for Even-Footing ‘Money’ Cases”
It is lastly true that phased discovery works better for some cases than 
others. This is so about any discovery system, of course, but it bears examining 
the “hard” cases and determining how phased discovery can be effective. The 
first such concern is of “information imbalance” or “information 
asymmetry.”145
Information asymmetry creates a scenario in which one party possesses all 
of the information necessary to set the proportions of discovery and the 
reasonable scope of each phase. The other party can only guess at an 
appropriate scope based on much more limited information.146 Therefore one
party can use that knowledge to drive the scope of discovery by making a case 
that the most helpful evidence to its legal theories be developed first (or last) 
depending on its tactical needs. A defendant, for example, with all of the 
evidence in its possession, might attempt to fashion phases of discovery so that 
the most helpful exculpatory evidence be examined first, allowing it to gain 
leverage in ongoing settlement discussions. 
Judges can alleviate the potential gamesmanship by heeding the rules’ 
direction to focus on access to discovery and to take an information-possessing 
party’s suggestion of phasing sequence with caution. Some judges may even 
wish to provide deference to the phases and scope proposed by the party 
without the information. Doing so could make the first phase of discovery an 
exercise to level the playing field with respect to information possession and 
allow both parties to examine record facts on equal footing, which would 
provide for more balanced settlement discussions. For example, under Judge 
Grimm's phasing regime he defines this first phase as a “base level” discovery 
“proportionate to the needs of the case, the burden and expense of which is 
borne by the producing party with the provision that any further discovery must 
be conditioned on a showing of good cause and an assessment of cost 
allocation.”147
Further, the Committee Notes caution against the trap of letting the amount 
in controversy, the most quantitative of all factors, become the dominant factor 
2_07-cv-02283-5.pdf (stating that dispositive motions cannot be “endless”). 
145. This phenomenon is described in the committee notes to the 2015 Amendments:
“The direction to consider the parties’ relative access to relevant information adds new text 
to provide explicit focus on considerations already implicit in present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
Some cases involve what often is called “information asymmetry.” One party — often an 
individual plaintiff — may have very little discoverable information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26
advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendments, at B-40.  
146. See, e.g., Rodney A. Satterwhite & Matthew J. Quatrara, Asymmetrical Warfare:
The Cost of Electronic Discovery in Employment Litigation, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 11 
(2008). 
147. Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform:
How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 
511 (2013).  
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in determining proportionality: 
It also is important to repeat the caution that the monetary stakes are only one 
factor, to be balanced against other factors. The 1983 Committee Note 
recognized ‘the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in 
philosophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many 
cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and 
other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary amount 
involved.’ Many other substantive areas also may involve litigation that seeks 
relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but that seeks to 
vindicate vitally important personal or public values.148
This sentiment reflects a change made in the 2015 amendments, where, 
after the public comment period, the proportionality standard’s “amount in 
controversy” factor was moved to a secondary position behind “the importance 
of the issues at stake in the action.”149 A system of phased discovery places a
greater emphasis on determining the most important discovery and examining it 
first. This decision-making process is the cornerstone of a proportionality 
analysis. In other words, the information discovery most likely to be 
“proportional” is also the information most likely to be discovered in the “first” 
or “early” phases. So it is prudent for judges and parties to be sensitive to using 
the right determinants. Using the “importance of the issues at stake” as a means 
to expand the initial phase of discovery is commonsensical. 
Indeed, in cases with extremely important issues, phasing need not be 
employed.150 However, if it is to become a useful tool for discovery, it should
be the norm, used in most cases, with “hard” cases as potential exceptions. 
Making phasing purely optional does little to change the status quo as it is 
today. After all, the current rules presently provide for phasing in any and every 
case. 
IV. BUT WOULD IT TAKE?: THE PRACTICAL RESISTANCE TO PHASING
It is difficult to ignore at this point that the reasons for phasing discovery 
are fairly straightforward and simple, taking little real estate in this article, yet 
the contemplated obstacles to its implementation are numerous, varied, and 
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendments, at B-41-B-42.
149. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015 Civil Rules Package As Transmitted to
Congress, E-DISCOVERY BLOG, (June 15, 2015), http://www.theediscoveryblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/2015SummaryofRulesPackage.pdf. 
150. See Carroll, supra note 54, at 465 (discussing a fixed discovery budget as “an
interesting concept, but a limited one, because it calls for a global proportionality analysis 
rather than a specific one. Where what is at stake is solely money and the maximum and 
minimum amounts can be easily quantified, pursuit of a discovery budget and limiting 
discovery based on that budget may well make sense and be appropriate. In a contract action, 
for example, where the maximum damages are $100,000, that figure may well represent 
what is ‘at stake’ in the litigation. But such monetizing of what is ‘at stake’ is not so easy 
where the issue is not breach of contract but constitutional or statutory civil rights.”). 
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lengthy. Why is that? One side effect of phased discovery that will make it 
more difficult to implement is its efficiency; if it works the way it should, there 
should be fewer cases, cases should be shorter, and litigants should be spending 
less on lawyers and (in many cases) more on redress of grievances. 
Something about that last sentence may have jumped out at many readers: 
the part about lawyers being paid less. That is the idea of proportionality in 
general and phased discovery in particular; as one can imagine, it is easier said 
than done when the principal drivers of implementation are doing so at the risk 
of their own bottom line.151
On the other hand, it is also useful to note once again that phasing is 
completely possible under the existing discovery rules and encouraged by the 
new rules.152 Yet it is not prevalent. Why not? Once again it seems overly=
simplistic to accredit this circumstance to inertia, although inertia should not be 
ignored. Or rather, perhaps inertia should be more closely examined. Why is 
change so hard to come by in the legal industry? 
A colloquial example with respect to the broader practice in electronic 
discovery may come to mind. Client asks a Lawyer why Lawyer has printed out 
electronic documents to review them, citing the inherent inefficiency in time 
and money for such an archaic practice. Lawyer responds that he has over thirty 
years of experience reviewing documents for trial on paper, following a certain 
process, which has produced exceptional results at a rate greater than mere 
chance would dictate. Lawyer presents his own metaphor to Client, asking 
Client to imagine a scenario in which Client was to undergo surgery. A surgeon 
is about to operate on Client—heart surgery—and gives Client a choice: a 
three-hour surgery at added cost, but using a method the surgeon knows by 
heart, or a two-hour surgery that is cheaper, but uses a method that the surgeon 
will be trying for the very first time. No patient, and no Client, would want to 
be the first test case, given the stakes.153
151. See Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 910-11 (discussing how limiting discovery cost is
not exactly in an unethical lawyer’s best interest). There is something to be said, however, 
for more efficient and less expensive cases reducing a barrier to the courts for parties, 
especially those with lesser means. Less expensive court cases may end up meaning that 
more litigants file more cases, making for more fees for more lawyers. See Ray Brescia, 
Disrupting the Law: How Technology Can Help Bridge the Justice Gap, HUFFINGTON POST 
TECH: THE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2014, 04:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ray-
brescia/disrupting-the-law-how-te_b_6093062.html; Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such a 
Thing as an Affordable Lawyer?, ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordable-
lawyer/371746. 
152. See, e.g., Laura E. Ellsworth et al., Significant Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Expected to Take Effect December 1, 2015: Practical Implications and 




153. Of course, “imagine I’m a doctor” is one of the most classic and popular fallacies
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Ultimately, the reasoning behind this illustration may be the underlying 
source of anticipated resistance to phasing, and also the explanation for its lack 
of prevalence. There is simply a resistance to trying a new method that may not 
work, when so much is (or at the very least, can be) at stake in litigation. No 
lawyer wants to explain to a client, nor a judge to litigants, that a new way of 
resolving a case did not work effectively. It is the fear of the “unknown 
unknown.”154 The idea that a smoking-gun document could exist in some
corner and never see the light of a trier of fact is one with a real grip on the 
minds of attorneys, even if the reality is that many smoking-gun documents are 
known to parties at the outset of litigation, and others are generally too 
potentially relevant to avoid discovery. 
In this way the axiom “the perfect is the enemy of the good” comes to 
mind. “Perfect” discovery is not only simply unattainable given the fallible 
nature of human recollection, it is simply not economically feasible given the 
complexity of big data. Indeed, the resistance to phasing may look like the 
industry's similar resistance to technology assisted review, which went from 
science fiction to accepted methodology in roughly three years.155 Insistence on
a perception of perfection through total completion comes at the expense of 
better systems, a point not lost on the judges adopting predictive coding.156
Opponents of machine-aided review refused to accept the hard data which 
clearly showed that TAR results in more effective and efficient document 
review.157 Over time—a brief amount of time—the hard data showed that
predictive coding, while seemingly “inhuman,” was faster, cheaper and more 
effective than human review.158
Here, phasing asks those similarly situated to accept a related idea: that 
human eyes cannot efficiently nor effectively lay upon all relevant materials in 
discovery, and that some potentially relevant information should be disregarded 
without human review.159 It follows that an insistence that the human eyes
committed by members of the bar. We can put that logical issue aside for the purposes of this 
example.  
154. See STEYN, supra note 19 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld).
155. Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing
technology assisted review’s road to acceptance, collecting cases, and stating that “[i]n the 
three years since Da Silva Moore, the case law has developed to the point that it is now black 
letter law that where the producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, courts 
will permit it.”). The Author of this Article remembers explaining TAR to a senior partner at 
a law firm in 2012, and receiving a response that could charitably be described as 
“extraordinarily suspicious.” That same partner now routinely uses TAR.  
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-
Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 43 (2011); Tim Stuhldreher, Predictive Coding Cuts Discovery 
Expenses, 28 CENT. PA. BUS. J. 19 (2012). 
159. See, e.g., Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 24, at 22-23 (“[P]erfection in preserving
all relevant electronically stored information is often impossible.” (quoting Comm. on Rules 
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review all potentially relevant material is counterproductive to the advancement 
of technology in litigation. 
The anticipated resistance to phased discovery is that it is antithetical to the 
notion that a litigant has an unalienable right in discovery to examine every slip 
of paper or every byte of data that could potentially make his case. However, as 
seen herein, this notion: (1) was never the intent of the Federal Rules and is 
therefore not accurate;160 (2) is dangerously unworkable in the current era of 
Big Data; and (3) is a self-defeating notion.161
The adoption of the 2015 FRCP amendments is still in its infancy, so time 
will tell whether or not they achieve their desired effect—and the effect judges 
want them to have—of increasing the use of proportionality as a limitation to 
discovery.162 If, as judges say, the rules cannot overstate the importance of a 
proportionality analysis, why not require that analysis? 
The current rules suggest such a result, but the lack of a requirement that 
judges use them allows for parties to set discovery—bilaterally or 
unilaterally—in the same old inefficient way. 
Judicial involvement is necessary in 2016 and beyond.163 Requiring a
of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Summary of the Report of the 
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rules App. B-61 at 41 
(Sept. 2014))) (noting that “[i]t is now beyond dispute that gathering and reviewing all 
available potentially relevant electronic data is a practical impossibility in most cases.”).  
160. Id. at 22 (noting that proportionality was first introduced in a revised Rule
26(b)(1)(iii) in 1983 to “address the problems of discovery that is disproportionate to the 
individual lawsuit” by limiting discovery or “bring[ing] about more tailored discovery,” and 
describing this event as a “watershed moment” in the development of the FRCP).  
161. This notion is self-defeating because, as discussed herein, it is the rare case indeed
in which a collection and fulsome examination of every single discoverable piece of 
information would be a cost effective method of resolving a dispute. Most, if not all, cases 
are not worth an examination of all discoverable information. See, e.g., Green, supra note 
14.
162. For example, a panel of federal judges stated that “the importance of
proportionality cannot be overstated in the Rules. The Rules already state that the Court must 
limit discovery if it determines that the burden or expense of discovery outweighs the 
benefit. So some definition for proportionality has been added. A new factor is ‘the parties’ 
relative access to information.’ This clause was added to take into account asymmetrical 
discovery and information.” Chuck Kellner, Georgetown eDiscovery Institute 2014 Update 
on Changes to FRCP, D4 DISCOVERY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://d4discovery.com/discover-
more/2014/11/georgetown-ediscovery-institute-2014-update-on-changes-to-
frcp#sthash.RL6t37oC.dpuf. 
163. See Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., No. 2:14-cv-1131, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165040, at *19 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015) (stating expressly that the new Rules prescribe 
“active judicial case management”); ROBERTS 2015 REPORT, supra note 41, at 9-10 (“The 
2015 civil rules amendments are a major stride toward a better federal court system. But they 
will achieve the goal of Rule 1—‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding’—only if the entire legal community, including the bench, bar, and 
legal academy, step up to the challenge of making real change. . . . It will also require a 
genuine commitment, by judges and lawyers alike, to ensure that our legal culture reflects 
the values we all ultimately share.”). 
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system of phased discovery is a strong way to make sure that discovery is 
proportional to the needs of the case and that the court and the parties “secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”164
CONCLUSION
Phasing is a common, proven technique used by savvy attorneys as a 
means to cooperatively limit discovery in a case, saving time and money. 
Phasing is used routinely by influential jurists such as Judge Paul Grimm as a 
standard for discovery cases, bringing reduced costs and better economy of 
judicial resources.165 Such is the cooperation contemplated by, and even
required by, the amendments to the 2015 rules. Practitioners should insist on 
phased discovery. Judges should require it. 
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
165. See Grimm, Discovery Order, supra note 102
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